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1 Introduction
A persistent feature of the world economy is the wide inequality in per capita
output across countries. According to the Penn World Tables 5.6, Mali’s output
per worker in 1990 was roughly 3% of the GDP per worker in the United States.
This means that incomes per capita diﬀer by a factor of 33.
Observers have pointed out several factors to explain diﬀerences in inter-
national incomes, such as geography,1 religion,2 colonial origins,3 institutions,4
and bad policies.5 It is deﬁnitely a hard task to assess separately the role
of each factor on the process of economic development. Surely, each one and
their interactions contribute to the determinants of the long-run performance
of economies.
In a recent book, De Soto (2000) argues that, as in the developed world, the
streets of less developed countries are full of talented and enthusiastic entrepre-
neurs. However, while in developed countries agents create capital from capital,
in developing countries the entrepreneurs’ assets are “dead capital.” This is
what he calls the “Mystery of Capital,” and what he points out as the major
determinant of why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else.
“In this book (The Mystery of Capital) I intend to demonstrate that the major
stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from beneﬁting from capitalism
is its inability to produce capital.” (De Soto (2000)[p. 5].)
Behind his idea are: i) the tremendous diﬃculties, in the form of regulation
1Sachs and Warner (1995).
2Landes (1998).
3Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
4North (1990).
5Parente and Prescott (2000).
2and corruption, for potential entrepreneurs in developing countries to open their
businesses; and ii) the lack of a well functioning property rights system, which
guarantees that agents can produce capital from their savings.
In this paper, we further study De Soto’s hypothesis, i.e., we investigate the
role of credit market imperfections and corruption on the process of economic
development. We address the question of how much of the diﬀerences in output
per capita across countries can be attributed to diﬀerences in credit market
policies and corruption. In order to accomplish that, we construct and solve
numerically a general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents, contractual
imperfections and occupational choices. The quantitative exercises suggest that
a country in which debt contracts are not enforced and corruption corresponds
to 10% of output will be roughly 1/3 to 1/2 as rich as the United States. Though
this is an important eﬀect, it is a small fraction of the huge diﬀerences in income
per capita across countries.
Our model clearly shares some features of a literature on the organization of
production and on the process of economic development. Agents in our frame-
work can choose to be either a worker or an entrepreneur. In this respect, this
paper is related to Lucas’ (1978) “span of control” model. Unlike this model,
ours is built upon a dynamic framework and uses credit constraints in the anal-
ysis of occupational choice. Agents are diﬀerentiated by their entrepreneurial
ability and their initial wealth. They care about their own consumption and the
initial wealth of their oﬀspring. In order to open a business, agents must buy in
advance the capital to ﬁnance their project. However, capital markets are im-
perfect and not necessarily the best project will be undertaken. This interaction
between wealth distribution and capital market imperfection is based on Baner-
jee and Newman (1993), which was also used by several authors, among whom
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) and Quintin (2001). However, the questions
addressed by these authors are not the same as those studied in this paper.
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) study the macroeconomic and distributional
3dynamics associated with the process of economic development, while Quintin
(2001) investigates how limited enforcement aﬀects the size distribution of ﬁrms
and productivity.
Notice also that our focus is on diﬀerences in income levels and not diﬀerences
in growth rates. Authors have already studied the eﬀects of enforcement and
corruption on economic growth (see Mauro (1995), King and Levine (1993) and
Marcet and Marimon (1992)). However, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) show that
diﬀerences in growth rates across countries are mostly transitory and explaining
diﬀerences in levels is the important problem in economic development (Parente
and Prescott (2000)).
This paper is divided as follows: the next section describes the model econ-
omy. Section 3 describes the agents’ optimal behavior, deﬁnes the competitive
equilibrium allocations, and presents some analytical results. Section 4 solves
the model numerically and conducts policy experiments. The last section pro-
vides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences, endowments and technology
2.1.1 Preferences
In each time period (t = 0,1,2,...), the economy consists of a continuum of
individuals in the unit interval. Each agent lives and is productive for one
period, then reproduces another individual so that the population is constant.
Agents care about their own consumption and leave bequest to their oﬀspring.
Let ci
t and bi
t+1 denote consumption and bequest, respectively, by agent i at
period t. Preferences are represented by
Ui = (ci
t)γ(bi
t+1)1−γ, γ ∈ (0,1). (1)
4This utility function implies that agents are risk-neutral with respect to income
as the indirect utility function is linear in wealth. This implies that any additive
punishment or reward in utility may be measured in terms of income. Notice
that, for tractability, we assume that preferences are for the bequest and not
the oﬀspring’s utility.6
2.1.2 Endowments
Each individual can be either a worker or an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs create
jobs and manage their labor force, n. As in Lucas’ (1978) “span of control,”
each individual is endowed with a talent for managing, xi, drawn from a contin-
uous cumulative probability distribution function Γ(x) with ﬁnite support [x,x],
where x ≥ 0. Therefore, in each period agents are distinguished by their initial
wealth and ability as entrepreneurs, (bi
t,xi
t). We assume that the agent’s talent
for managing is not hereditary. (For notational convenience, we shall now, and
for the remainder of this paper, drop superscript i to denote the agent.)
2.1.3 Production technologies
The technology that managers operate uses labor, n, and capital, k, to produce
a single consumption good, y, and is represented by
y = xkαnβ, α, β > 0, and α + β < 1. (2)
Capital fully depreciates during one period. Managers can operate only one
project. In order to operate a technology, entrepreneurs must pay a start up
cost, ς, in the form of regulations and corruption. This cost is assumed to be
independent of the ﬁrm output since it is an ex-ante payment to the government.
De Soto (1989, 2000) has shown that this cost varies across countries and is
especially high in developing countries. Firms also pay an uniform payroll tax,
τ.
6See Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) for a similar
formulation.
52.2 The capital market
Agents can borrow capital from a ﬁnancial intermediary with access to perfect
outside capital markets, in which a risk-free bond earns a gross return of r ≥
1. Let l be the amount of funds that an agent borrows from the ﬁnancial
intermediary. In order to ﬁnance their projects, constrained agents must put up
their initial wealth, b, as collateral. Borrowers cannot commit ex-ante to their
individual promises and can avoid the repayment obligation, rl, by defaulting
on their debt and loosing rb. Those that renege on their debt loose the collateral
and incur in a cost proportional to what was produced, φy. This is equivalent
to an additive punishment in utility. This cost reﬂects the degree in which
contracts are enforced in the economy. A higher φ means a better quality of the
legal system or a stricter protection to investors. La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that countries diﬀer enormously in the extend
to which they provide legal protection to investors.7 The point here is that, in
contrast to Banerjee and Newman (1993), the quality of the project will be an
important determinant of external debt.8 Loans will be limited by the agents
inheritance and the degree in which contracts are enforced.
2.3 Summing up
In order to characterize the optimal behavior and decisions of each agent, it is
useful to describe the timing of events in the economy. In each period events
occur sequentially. At the beginning of a period, each agent receives his bequest
and the uncertainty about his ability is resolved. Next, each agent observes the
endogenously determined wage and his credit limit, and decides his occupational
7We do not model the Legal Code and the Credit Protection System. φ proxies for the
degree in which investors are protected. See Krasa and Villamil (2002) for a model in which
the characteristics of the judiciary system aﬀect ﬁrm ﬁnance.
8 Several studies have shown (see, in particular, Cohn and Coleman (2000)) that proﬁtabil-
ity of the ﬁrm is an important predictor of external debt, suggesting that lenders may use
individual and business characteristics to evaluate projects.
6choice. The acquisition of capital is then carried out if the agent decides to be-
come entrepreneur. This step may involve borrowing, in which case his bequest
is put as collateral. Production then takes place and the agent receives either
the wage rate or proﬁts. Then the agent decides whether to default or not. If
he defaults, he looses the collateral and interest and must pay a cost propor-
tional to what was produced. If he repays his loan and interest, he receives the
collateral and interest. Finally, the agent consumes out of his holdings, leaves
bequest to the next generation, and dies.
3 Optimal behavior and equilibrium
3.1 Entrepreneurs
Those who have enough resources and managerial ability to become entrepre-
neurs choose the level of capital and the number of employees to maximize
proﬁts subject the technological constraint. Since capital markets are imper-
fect, let us describe the problem of an entrepreneur for a given level of capital
k. The problem of an entrepreneur with capital k is
π(k,x;w) = max
n xkαnβ − (1 + τ)wn, (3)









Substituting (4) into (3) yields the entrepreneur’s proﬁt function for a given
level of capital,













π(k,x;w) − r(k + ς). (6)












Since agents cannot commit to their promises, debt contracts must be self-
enforcing. Let a be the amount of capital that is self-ﬁnanced (or used as a
collateral) and l be the amount of funds that is ﬁnanced in the outside capital
market. The income from running a project is:
V (b,x;w) = max
0≤a≤b, l≥0
π(a + l,x;w) − r(a + l + ς) (8)
subject to
π(a + l,x;w) − r(a + l + ς) ≥ (1 − φ)π(a + l,x;w) − ra.
This problem yields optimal policy functions a(b,x;w) and l(b,x;w). The total
amount of capital used is k(b,x;w) = a(b,x;w)+l(b,x;w). The last restriction
is an incentive compatible constraint, which guarantees that individual promises





π(a(b,x;w) + l(b,x;w),x;w) − ς.
It can be shown that constrained entrepreneurs put their entire wealth in the
project as long as b ≤ k∗(x;w).9 This implies that the size of a project of an
entrepreneur (b,x) is limited above:
k(b,x;w) ≤ b + ∆(b,x;w), (9)
where ∆(b,x;w) =
φ
rπ(b+l(b,x;w),x;w)−ς. Therefore, projects are limited by
the agents inheritance and the incompleteness of the capital market, represented
by ∆(b,x;w). Notice that ∆(b,x;w) is increasing with the quality of the project.
The idea behind this capital market is that ﬁnancial intermediaries evaluate
prospective entrepreneurs and choose the most promising projects (King and
9Just solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of problem (8).
8Levine (1993)). Therefore, a more developed capital market (φ close to one)
fosters economic development by choosing higher quality projects.
The following lemma summarizes the value of undertaking each project:
Lemma 1 For any x ∈ [x,x], and w > 0, the value function V (b,x;w), and
the associated policy function l(b,x;w), have the following properties:
1. V (b,x;w) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in x and w. It is also strictly
increasing in x and strictly decreasing in w.
2. For b < k∗(x;w), V (·,x;w) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly in-
creasing. For b > k∗(x;w), V (·,x;w) is constant.
3. l(b,x;w) is strictly increasing for b < k∗(w;w) and l(b,x;w) = 0 for
b > k∗(w;w).
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
3.2 Occupational choice
The occupational choice of each agent deﬁnes his lifetime income. For any
w > 0, an agent (b,x) will become an entrepreneur if (b,x) ∈ E(w), where
E(w) = {(b,x) ∈ [0,∞) × [x,x] : V (x,b;w) ≥ w}. (10)
Let Ec(w) denote the complement set of E(w). Obviously, if (b,x) ∈ Ec(w),
then agents are workers.
The following lemma characterizes the occupational choice for a given be-
quest and entrepreneurial ability.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne b(x;w) such that (b,x) ∈ [0,∞) × [x,x] and V (b,x,w) = w.
Then there exists x∗(w) such that
∂b(x;w)
∂x < 0 for x > x∗(w) and
∂b(x;w)
∂x = −∞
for x = x∗(w). In addition, for each x
1. if b < b(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ Ec(w).
92. if b ≥ b(x;w), then (b,x) ∈ E(w).
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates this lemma. It shows the occupational choice in the (b,x)
space for the baseline economy (see parameters on section 4). Lemma 2 and
Figure 1 suggests that agents are workers when the quality of their project is
low, i.e., x < x∗(w) (the lightest shaded area). For x ≥ x∗(w), then agents might
become entrepreneurs depending if they are credit constrained or not (notice
that for very low bequests agents are workers even though their entrepreneurial
ability is higher than x∗(w)). The negative association between b(x;w) and x
suggests that managers with better projects need a lower level of initial wealth
to run a project. This is rather intuitive since proﬁts are increasing in the














Figure 1: Firm size distribution in the formal and informal sectors.
103.3 Consumers
The lifetime wealth of agent (b,x) is given by
Y (bt,xt) = max{wt,V (bt,xt;wt)} + rbt, (11)
Lifetime wealth is thus a function of agent-speciﬁc bt and xt, and economy-wide
wt, r, τ, φ, and ς. Given the lifetime wealth, (11), agents choose consumption
and bequest to maximize preferences (1). This problem deﬁnes the optimal
consumption, ct = c(Yt), and bequest, bt+1 = b(Yt), policies. The functional
form of (1) implies that agents leave a proportion 1 − γ of their lifetime wealth
as a bequest. Notice that bequests cannot be negative because every agent is
allowed to become a worker. Let ut be a vector of all economy-wide variables
and structural parameters, ut = (wt,r,τ,φ,ς), and let zt = (bt,xt). Deﬁne the
measurable space (Z,B), where B is the Borel algebra for the set Z = R+×[x,x],
and the bequest (or wealth) probability measure, Ht : B → [0,1], which speciﬁes
the probability of each event in B. Since the distribution of ability is invariant
and independent from the initial bequest distribution, there exist a probability





Wt is therefore the bequest distribution at period t.
3.4 Competitive equilibrium
Deﬁnition: Given λ = (τ,φ,ς), r, Γ, Wt, equilibrium at date t is a list wt,
nt = n(x;wt), lt = l(b,x;wt), at = a(b,x;wt), V (b,x;wt), ct = c(b,x;wt),
bt+1 = b0(b,x;wt), such that:
A. Given the wage rate and government policies, an agent of type (b,x)
chooses his occupation to maximize his lifetime wealth, (11).
10We make the abuse of notation of using the same letter to designate distribution functions
and probability measures.
11B. l(b,x;wt) and a(b,x;wt) solve (8).
C. Given the lifetime wealth, (11), c(b,x;wt) and b0(b,x;wt) maximize utility
(1) for agent of type (b,x).
D. Given the wage rate, technology constraint, credit markets, and govern-
ment policies, entrepreneurs select their labor force to maximize proﬁts,
(3).







Notice that we just stated the labor market equilibrium condition. This is
because interest rate is already determined, r, and Walras’ law takes care of the
goods market.
In the quantitative exercises it is important to evaluate policy experiments
in “stable” economies, where, for instance, the real wage and income distribu-
tion are not changing signiﬁcantly over time. Indeed, it is possible to show that
when policies and institutions are stationary a unique steady-state equilibrium
exists (i.e., an equilibrium with a constant real wage, w, and invariant distribu-
tion, H = WΓ) and from any initial condition the economy converges to this
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium with 0 < w < ∞
and invariant distribution W. In addition, for any initial bequest distribution
W0 and stationary government policies and institutions λ, the bequest distribu-
tion converges to W.
Proof. See appendix C.
In the calibration and quantitative experiments we will study the economy
in this particular equilibrium and therefore we will consider the long run impact
of changes in policies and institutions.
124 Quantitative results
4.1 Parameterization
In order to solve out the model numerically we have to choose functional forms
for the ability distribution and assign values to the parameters of the model,
namely γ, α, β, r, τ, ς and φ. We parameterize the model such that, in the











Table 1: Parameter Values, Baseline Economy.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values, which were determined as follows.
We assumed that the entrepreneurial cumulative distribution function is Γ(x) =
Ax
1
², and we normalized the support of this distribution to interval [0,1], so that
A = 1. We used parameter ² to match the income Gini coeﬃcient of the US
economy, which was 0.40 in 2000 (see World Bank (2000)). We assume the
productive lifespan of the agents to be 35 years and we let r = 2, which implies
a yearly real interest rate of roughly 2%. We set α and β such that about
55% of income is paid to labor, 35% is paid to the remuneration of capital,
and 10% are proﬁts (see Quintin (2001)). We chose a payroll tax of τ = 0.33,
which is consistent to the literature (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993)). Since
regulation costs are small in the United States,11 we assumed that they are
negligible relative to lifetime proﬁts of entrepreneurs and we set ς = 0. The
11According to Loayza (1996) it takes about three to four hours to register a small factory
in the United States at almost no income costs.
13share of bequests in the instantaneous utility function, 1 − γ, was taken to be
0.2, which is consistent to estimates by Laitner and Juster (1996). The variable
that measures the degree in which debt contracts are enforced, φ, was chosen
so that the ratio of entrepreneurs over the total population matches that of the
real economy.12 The value of φ was 0.15, which implies that entrepreneurs are
5.8% of total population
US Economy Baseline Economy
% of entrepreneurs 5.8 5.8
Income Gini (%) 40 40
% of business income 25 36
Business income Gini (%) 45 57
Table 2: Basic statistics, US and baseline economy. Sources: Cagetti and De Nardi
(2002); all ﬁgures in percentage.
The baseline economy reproduces statistics consistent to those of the US
economy. Table 2 also reports some other statistics. The ﬁrst measure is income
of entrepreneurs as a percentage of total income. Entrepreneurial income as a
percentage of total income is around 25% in the United States and 36% in
the model. The other statistic shown is the Gini coeﬃcient of entrepreneurial
income, which is around 45% in the PSID data and 57% in the model. These
values indicate that the model compensates the lack of inequality in income
wages (workers receive the same equilibrium wage) with a higher inequality
among entrepreneurs, a question that we address later.
Figure 2 shows the entrepreneur’s decision rule given his entrepreneurial
ability and bequest. The horizontal area (when ability is low) corresponds to
those agents that are workers. As the entrepreneurial ability increases, the size
of the projects increases monotonically up to the point where entrepreneurs
become ﬁnancially constrained. This set of points corresponds to the change
in the slope of the ﬁgure. For higher ability, agents can borrow part of the
remaining value of the project.





























Figure 2: Firm size distribution in the baseline economy.
4.2 Policy experiments
With all parameters determined, we run some policy experiments to provide a
numerical assessment of the long-run impact of corruption and enforcement on
output per capita.
The results indicate a quantitatively sizeable impact of ﬁnancial constraints
on the structure of the economy. We can see this by looking at the rows of
Table 3 labelled φ = 0 and φ = 1. These rows correspond to economies with no
enforcement and full enforcement, respectively. In the ﬁrst case, output falls to
47% of the baseline economy. This implies that improvements in the degree in
which debt contracts are enforced would increase output per capita by a factor
of 2. It suggests that a country in which debt contracts are not enforced will
be roughly 1/2 as rich as the United States. We can also see in Table 2 that
an economy with perfect enforcement would increase output by half compared
to the baseline economy. Notice that φ goes from 0.15 to 1 in that case. This
indicates that ﬁnancial constraints have a higher impact on economies with poor
15enforcement.
Output per capita % of entrepreneurs Income Gini (%)
US economy 100 5.8 40
Baseline 100 5.8 40
φ = 0 47 8.6 36
φ = 1 150 2.8 17
φ = 0 and ς = 0.001 46 8.4 36
φ = 0 and ς = 0.0085 43 7.2 35
Table 3: Basic statistics, baseline economy. Sources: Cagetti and De Nardi (2002) and
Quadrini (1999); all ﬁgures in percentage.
The second important statistic is the number of entrepreneurs. When ﬁnan-
cial contracts are more enforced, the fraction of agents that are entrepreneurs in
the economy decreases. The number of entrepreneurs decreases with higher en-
forcement, but the quality (size and productivity) of each entrepreneur’s project
increases. This is consistent to the empirical observations, which show that less
developed countries tend to have more but less productive entrepreneurs (see
Tybout (2000)).
Comparing with the baseline economy, income distribution becomes less un-
equal when there is perfect or no enforcement at all. There are two eﬀects
to explain this outcome. First, when enforceability increases, the average pro-
ductivity tends to increase, since entrepreneurs become less constrained. This
would tend to increase inequality. But this implies that wages also become
higher, thus reducing inequality. This later eﬀect dominates the former when φ
goes to one. When φ goes to 0, the fall on the income Gini is moderate. The
reduction of ﬁrms’ average productivity is accompanied by a decrease in wages.
To assess the impact of ﬁrm start-up costs on the number of employees and
on output per capita we change parameter ς (ﬁfth and sixth rows of Table 3).
Using data from the Peruvian economy (see De Soto (1989)), we set ς in terms
of a markup of the monthly average wage, and φ to zero.13 This start-up cost
13We chose ς equal to 31 times the present value of a stream of a monthly wage rate whose
present value equals the lifetime wage.
16corresponds to roughly 1.2% of the present value of average business income.
The results indicate that output and the number of entrepreneurs are not much
aﬀected relative to the case with no enforcement and no start-up costs. Since
corruption and regulation are diﬃcult to measure, we also run an experiment
with ς equal to 10% of the present value of average business income. The results
are in the sixth row of Table 3. Relative to the previous case, output and the
number of entrepreneurs do not change signiﬁcantly. Since ς increased by a
factor of 8, this seems to indicate that corruption and regulation have a small
impact on the long run output per capita.
We should highlight, however, that corruption and regulation might have a
sizeable eﬀect on the size of the informal (unregulated) sector. An unregulated
sector would add another margin in which agents could substitute, and to avoid
corruption and regulation agents could go underground. Depending on the
characteristics of this sector, corruption could have an impact on output per
capita (see Antunes and Cavalcanti (2003)) similar to those associated with
credit market policies.
4.3 Sensitivity to parameters
As stated above, this model does not display wage inequality. This could be
introduced by means of a “working ability” that would diﬀerentiate among work-
ers. This inequality, however, would simply reﬂect the randomness of working
productivity, which is not important to our purposes. The parameterization
based on the income Gini suggests that the entrepreneurial distribution might
be too uneven (see Table 2). In order to assess the impact of the distribution
on output per capita, we calibrated the model by targeting the business income
Gini coeﬃcient instead of the income Gini. The parameters of Table 1 remain
unchanged except for φ = 0.5 and ² = 6.5. For this parameterization, the results
of changing φ from 0.5 to 0 and 1 are presented in Table 4.
When φ varies, the results are quantitatively close to those in Table 2 in
17Output % of % of business Business income
per capita entrepreneurs income Gini (%)
US economy 100 5.8 25 45
φ = 0.5, ² = 6.5 100 5.8 26 45
φ = 0 43 12.4 37 42
φ = 1 102 4.2 16 39
Table 4: Basic statistics, model economy. Parameterization with targeting of business
income Gini coeﬃcient; all ﬁgures in percentage.
terms of output variation, and number of entrepreneurs. For instance, when φ
goes to 0, output per capita decreases to about 43% of the baseline income, and
the percentage of entrepreneurs increases.
Table 5 shows the equilibrium results for output and the percentage of entre-
preneurs when we change other parameters of the model. The second row shows
the impact of increasing the lifespan to 45 years. The number of entrepreneurs
does not change, whereas, as expected, output increases by 6%. The third row
displays the case in which agents are not altruistic. The eﬀect is sizeable on the
percentage of entrepreneurs and on output per capita. Notice, however, that
with γ = 1 and φ = 0 the economy would collapse because everybody would
be credit-constrained. In this case, ﬁnancial constraints could explain any dif-
ference in output among countries. But this is a rather extreme case. The
fourth row shows the results for a higher propensity to leave bequest. Output
is much higher because agents are less credit constrained and as a consequence
productivity increases. Notice that the existence of equilibrium requires that
γ > 1−1/r. The model therefore displays some sensitivity to parameter γ, while
for the other parameters the quantitative conclusions seem robust. There is no
reason, however, to assume that the altruism degree varies across countries.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the role of credit market imperfections and corrup-
tion on the process of economic development. We address the question of how
18Output per capita % of entrepreneurs
Baseline 100 5.8
r = 2.58 106 5.9
γ = 1 72 3.8
γ = 0.7 143 6.0
Table 5: Basic statistics, changes in parameters relative to the baseline; all ﬁgures in
percentage.
much of the diﬀerences in output per capita across countries can be attributed
to diﬀerences in credit market policies and corruption. For reasonable param-
eterizations, the quantitative exercises suggest that a country in which debt
contracts are not enforced and corruption corresponds to 10% of output will
be roughly 1/3 to 1/2 as rich as the United States. Though this is an sizeable
eﬀect, it is a small fraction of the huge diﬀerences in income per capita across
countries.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Continuity of V (b,x;w) follows from the Maximum Theorem and diﬀerentiabil-
ity from theorem 4.11 of Stokey and Lucas (1989).
The Lagrangean associated with problem (8) is
L = π(a + l,x;w) − r(a + l + ς) + λ[φπ(a + l,x;w) − r(l + ς)] + χ[b − aj].
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂L
∂l












λ[φπ(a + l,x;w) − r(l + ς)] = 0, (15)







From (13), (14), and (16) it follows that a(b,x;w) = b.
From the Envelope Theorem it can be shown that
Vx(b,x;w) = π1(b + l(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λφ) > 0,
Vw(b,x;w) = π3(b + l(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λφ) < 0,
If b ≤ k∗(x;w), then
Vb(b,x;w) = π1(b + l(b,x;w),x;w)(1 + λ) > 0.
When b > k∗(x;w), then by deﬁnition of k∗(x;w), the net income from en-
trepreneurship cannot increase and Vb(b,x;w) = 0. For b > k∗(x;w) it is also
22obvious that l(b,x;w) = 0. When agents are credit constrained, the incentive
compatible constraint holds with equality and








By condition (13), we have that r − φπ1(b,x;w) =
π1(b,x;w)−r
λ . Since this is for








B Proof of Lemma 2
For unconstrained agents, b ≥ k∗(x;w), and we have that
V (b,x;w) ≥ w,










1 − α − β
¶1−α−β
.
x∗(w) is independent of b. For constrained agents with x ≥ x∗(w), we have that







which is negative from lemma 1.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Here we provide the sketch of the proof. For a complete argument see Antunes
and Cavalcanti (2003). This proof is an application of theorem 2 of Hopenhayn
and Prescott (1992). The ﬁrst step is to show compactness of the state space
23(b,x). Entrepreneurial ability is bounded by assumption. It can be shown that,
from any initial bequest distribution with bounded support, the equilibrium
wage rate w ∈ [w,w], with w > 0 and w < ∞. This in turn implies that
b ∈ [b,b], with b > 0 and b < ∞. Then, Z = [b,b] × [x,x] is compact. The




where Pt is the endogenous transition function and Ht is a probability measure.
This operator is increasing. Intuitively, this means that, given the equilibrium
wage rate wt, an agent would never be worse oﬀ in terms of the expected value
of bt+1 if, for any ε > 0, his state were zt + ε instead of zt. Since the ability
distribution is independent across generations, the model displays income mo-
bility and the Monotonic Mixing Conditions are satisﬁed. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), there exists a unique time-invariant
distribution W and associated equilibrium wage w, such that from any initial
distribution W0, the operator T∗Ht converges to W.
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